

Philosophical Expertise

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Abstract: Learning more about philosophical cognition has yielded significant insights into the methods that we employ when doing philosophy, and has led some experimental philosophers to raise concerns about the role that intuitions play in philosophical practice. One popular response to these methodological concerns involves appeal to philosophical expertise, and has become known as the *expertise defense* because it aims to defend the use of at least some kinds of intuitional evidence in philosophy. The basic idea is that philosophical expertise consists in having developed, through a process of critical reflection, increased conceptual competence and theoretical accuracy, as well as a special knack for reading and thinking about philosophical thought experiments that call upon us to exercise our conceptual competence and theoretical acumen. It turns out to be an open question whether this *folk theory of philosophical expertise* can restore hope in the value of intuitional evidence, and here we examine two ways of trying to answer that question: one that involves careful reflection on the supposed benefits of philosophical education, and one that involves careful empirical examination of “expert” philosophical intuitions.

Key Words: Actor/Observer Bias, Conceptual Competence, Expertise Defense, Order Effects, Philosophical Education, Philosophical Intuitions, Procedural Knowledge, Restrictionist Challenge, The Side-Effect Effect, and Theoretical Acumen.

1. The Expertise Defense

Experimental philosophers are often interested in thinking about how our minds work and how we think about philosophical issues, and believe that the best way to do this involves the application of methods from the social and cognitive sciences. Learning more about philosophical cognition has yielded significant insights into the methods that we employ when doing philosophy, and has led some experimental philosophers to raise concerns about the role that intuitions play in philosophical practice (for discussion, see Alexander and Weinberg 2007, and Alexander 2012). It turns out that different people have different intuitions and that people’s intuitions are sensitive to a range of things that are both unwelcome and unexpected. What makes this situation worse is that, because we know so little about the cognitive processes involved, we currently lack the resources needed to determine whose intuitions to trust and when to trust them. Weinberg (2007) calls this kind of situation hopeless (in a technical sense), but not hopelessly so, and the challenge is to figure out how best to restore hope to the way that most philosophers go about the business of doing philosophy.

One increasingly popular response to this challenge involves appeal to philosophical expertise, and has become known as the *expertise defense* because it aims to defend the use of at least some kinds of intuitional evidence in philosophy.¹ Here are two particularly clear examples of this defense:

What is called for is the development of a discipline in which general expertise in the conduct of thought experiments is inculcated and in which expertise in different fields of conceptual inquiry is developed and refined. There is such a discipline. It is called philosophy. Philosophers are best suited by training and expertise to conduct thought experiments in their areas of expertise and to sort out the methodological and conceptual issues that arise in trying to get clear about the complex structure of concepts with which we confront the world. (Ludwig 2007, 151)

Intuitions are and should be sensitive to education and training in the relevant domain. For example, the physical intuitions of professional scientists are much more trustworthy than those of undergraduates or random persons in a bus station. Scientists have and rely on physical intuitions, intuitions that are trained, educated, and informed and yet are good indicators of truth for those very reasons. In the same way, the modal intuitions of professional philosophers are much more reliable than either those of inexperienced students or the “folk”. (Hales 2006, 171)

As you can see, the expertise defense is almost devilishly straightforward: some philosophical intuitions are better than others, and philosophers should be interested in *expert* philosophical intuitions rather than *folk* philosophical intuitions.² Who are the experts? Philosophers, of course. After all, philosophers have better concepts and theories, or at least a better understanding of the relevant concepts and theories, have thought long and hard about these concepts and theories, and have been trained in how best to read and think about philosophical thought experiments that call upon us to apply these concepts and theories.

Let’s call this the *folk theory of philosophical expertise*. It is an attractive theory that promises to restore our hope in at least some kinds of intuitional evidence. The trouble is that it turns out to be really difficult to determine who has expertise about what and when. Only certain kinds of training help improve task performance and, even then, only for certain kinds of tasks, and there is reason to worry both that philosophical training is not the right kind of training and that thought experimentation is not the right kind of task (for discussion, see Weinberg et al. 2010).³ And so it is an open question whether the folk theory of philosophical expertise can actually restore hope in our ordinary ways of going about the business of doing philosophy.⁴ In this chapter, we will examine two ways of trying to answer this open question: one that involves careful reflection on the supposed benefits of philosophical education, and one that involves careful empirical examination of “expert” philosophical intuitions.

2. A Folk Theory of Philosophical Expertise

According to the folk theory of philosophical expertise, philosophical education involves thinking long and hard about philosophical issues, and philosophical expertise consists in having developed, through this process of critical reflection, increased conceptual competence and theoretical accuracy, as well as a special knack for reading and thinking about philosophical thought experiments that call upon us to exercise our conceptual competence and theoretical acumen. Here is a nice expression of this view:

The uninformed observer and the sophisticated scientist are each trying to capture an independently existing phenomenon, and accurate background theory aids in that task. Experts are better observers than the uninitiated. If the situation of philosophical theory construction is analogous, as I believe it is, then we should see philosophers as attempting to characterize, not their concepts, let alone the concepts of the folk, but certain extra-mental phenomena, such as knowledge, justification, the good, the right, and so on. The intuitions of professional philosophers are better in getting at these phenomena than the intuitions of the folk because philosophers have thought long and hard about the phenomena, and their concepts, if all is working as it should, come closer to accurately characterizing the phenomena under study than those of the naïve. (Kornblith 2007, 35)

Let's begin with the idea that philosophers have better concepts. One way of cashing this idea out is to suggest that philosophical discussions involve technical concepts and that philosophical education helps philosophers acquire these concepts. While there are certainly some philosophical discussions that involve technical concepts, for example, discussions about the nature of validity or warranted assertability, the problem with this suggestion is that most philosophical discussions seem to involve rather more ordinary concepts, and for good reason. Since concerns about ordinary concepts are precisely what give rise to most philosophical discussions, if these discussions were then couched in purely technical terms, they would lose traction with the ordinary concerns that give rise to them in the first place (for discussion, see Nichols 2004, Knobe and Nichols 2008).

Let's assume this is right, and that most philosophical discussions involve ordinary concepts. Maybe philosophers simply have a better understanding of these ordinary concepts, something that allows them to make more precise conceptual distinctions (Ludwig 2007). This would certainly make expert intuitional evidence more valuable than folk intuitional evidence, but it is important to be clear that questions of comparative conceptual competence are themselves open empirical questions, and, even then, are extraordinarily hard to resolve (Knobe and Nichols 2008, and Alexander, Mallon, and Weinberg 2010). Here's why. Evidence that philosophers have a different understanding of ordinary concepts would not be evidence that they have a better understanding of those concepts unless we had some independent reason to think that philosophical education somehow improves our conceptual understanding, and it is simply not clear how this is supposed to happen. Most philosophers seem to think that it happens through a process of trial and error, where philosophers train their conceptual competencies by checking their conceptual judgments against some received standard, but this invites worries about pernicious explanatory regress and bootstrapping, and more general worries that philosophical intuitions do not receive anything like the kind of objective feedback necessary to improve conceptual understanding (for discussion, see Weinberg et al. 2010).⁵

While questions of comparative conceptual competence prove hard to answer, it seems easy to grant that philosophical education helps improve our understanding of philosophical theories. With this in mind, perhaps philosophical expertise consists in having mastered some set of

philosophical theories or principles (Kornblith 2007 and Ludwig 2007). The idea underwriting this suggestion is that philosophical theories can help shape our intuitions, perhaps by making certain features of a given thought experiment salient or by guiding our interpretation of those features. This is an appealing suggestion, but one that faces several problems. The first problem is that conceptual judgments filtered through philosophical theory might not even count as philosophical intuitions – at the very least, the filtering process would have to be unconscious or otherwise introspectively opaque in order for these conceptual judgments to count as genuine philosophical intuitions. Another problem is that theoretical commitments are just as likely to contaminate our conceptual judgments as they are to decontaminate them. This means that the fact that expert intuitional evidence is theoretically informed does little to ensure that it is better than folk intuitional evidence. This point has prompted some philosophers to argue that we need to be careful that the theories that influence expert intuitional evidence are accurate (Kornblith 2007), but questions of theoretical accuracy again invite worries of pernicious explanatory regress and bootstrapping since we advance philosophical theories on the basis of their ability to explain our philosophical intuitions, and appeal to philosophical intuitions as evidence that these theories are true and reasons for believing as such.

Let's pause for a moment to take stock. On the view that we are examining, philosophical education involves thinking long and hard about philosophical issues, and this process of critical reflection is not only supposed to increase conceptual competence and theoretical accuracy, but also to improve our ability to read and think about the kinds of philosophical thought experiments that call upon us to exercise our conceptual competence and theoretical acumen. We have seen that questions of comparative conceptual competence and increased theoretical accuracy are hard to answer, and even worse that there are reasons to worry that what answers we find will not bring good news for the folk theory of philosophical expertise. The situation actually gets even more complicated when we turn our attention to the idea that philosophical expertise involves some kind of procedural knowledge, or special "know-how," developed over the course of our philosophical education. Sosa (2009) provides a nice example of what this procedural knowledge might involve. The vignettes used in philosophical thought experiments require readers to import a certain amount of information not explicitly contained in the passages themselves, something that makes reading philosophical thought experiments similar to reading fiction (see also Camp 2009, and Ichikawa and Jarvis 2009). If this is right, then we might think that, since philosophers have spent more time reading and thinking about philosophical thought experiments, they will be better able to get at the relevant details of a given vignette, better able to appropriately fill in details not explicitly contained in the vignette, and better able to entertain those details in their imaginations. Williamson (2007) advances a similar position, arguing that philosophical thought experiments involve deductively valid arguments with counterfactual premises, and that evaluating them requires a mixture of imaginative simulation, background information, and logic. If this is right, then we might again think that, since philosophers have spent more time reading and thinking about philosophical thought experiments, they will be better able to pick out the relevant details of a particular vignette, better able to engage in counterfactual reasoning, and better able to make appropriate logical inferences.

The idea that philosophical expertise consists of some kind of special procedural knowledge is certainly attractive, but it is important to be clear that questions of comparative procedural expertise, like questions of comparative conceptual competence and increased theoretical acumen, are open empirical questions. They simply cannot be answered without careful empirical investigation. There is also a more general concern that needs to be addressed at this point. The whole idea that philosophical education produces philosophical expertise, whatever philosophical expertise might involve, is predicated on the idea that reflection improves cognitive performance. This idea about the relationship between reflection and cognition is what makes it seem so natural to think that, since philosophers spend more time thinking about philosophical issues, expert philosophical cognition should be better than folk philosophical cognition. The problem is that the relationship between reflection and cognition is not this straightforward. There are times when reflection helps improve philosophical cognition. Goldman (2007) provides some nice examples: reflection can help us realize that we have been misinformed or uninformed about some relevant details of a particular case, that we had lost track of some of the relevant details, or that our initial judgments about what details are relevant were contaminated by our theoretical commitments. But there are also times where reflection serves as an echo chamber, simply ratifying whatever initial judgments we might have made, and increasing the confidence we have in those judgments without increasing their reliability (Kornblith 2010, and for discussion Weinberg and Alexander 2014). This makes it far from obvious that expert philosophical cognition is better than folk philosophical cognition, and points again to the need for careful empirical investigation about the comparative merits of expert philosophical cognition and folk philosophical cognition.

3. Empirical Work on Expert Philosophical Intuitions

So far we have focused on the perceived benefits of philosophical education, and found that the picture is not quite as clear as we might have hoped, something that puts pressure on our folk theory of philosophical expertise. We have also noticed that many of the questions that have been raised are open empirical questions – questions about comparative conceptual competence and improved theoretical acumen, as well as questions about the role that philosophical education might play in the production of special procedural knowledge. So perhaps a better place to look for help is science, and recent empirical work on the nature of expert intuitional evidence. If philosophical education produces genuine philosophical expertise, then we might expect expert intuitional evidence not to display the same patterns of problematic sensitivity that folk intuitional evidence displays and that philosophical education does not introduce new patterns of problematic sensitivity (for discussion, see Weinberg and Alexander 2014). Let's see whether this is the case.

Some folk philosophical intuitions are unstable, including folk philosophical intuitions about what actions are morally good/bad. It seems that folk intuitions about what actions are morally good/bad in case Φ and what actions are morally good/bad in case Ψ depend on the order in which the cases are presented (Petrinovich and O'Neill 1996, Lombrozo 2009, Liao et al. 2012, and, for discussion, Sinnott-Armstrong 2008). With that in mind, consider the following two cases:

Case A

Jane is standing on a footbridge over the railroad tracks when she notices an empty boxcar rolling out of control. It is moving so fast that anyone it hits will die. Ahead on the track are five people. There is a person standing near Jane on the footbridge, and he weighs enough that the boxcar would slow down if it hit him. (Jane does not weigh enough to slow down the boxcar.) The footbridge spans that main track. If Jane does nothing, the boxcar will hit the five people on the track. If Jane pushes the one person, that one person will fall on the track, where the boxcar will hit the one person, stop because of the one person, and not hit the five people on the track.

Case B

Vicki is standing by the railroad tracks when she notices an empty boxcar rolling out of control. It is moving so fast that anyone it hits will die. Ahead on the main track are five people. There is one person standing on a side track that doesn't the main track. If Vicki does nothing, the boxcar will hit the five people on the main track. If Vicki flips a switch next to her, it will divert the boxcar to the side track where it will hit the one person, and not hit the five people on the main track.

If expert philosophical intuitions about what actions are morally good/bad are influenced by stable moral considerations, then these intuitions should not be affected by the order of presentation. This is not what we find. In a study involving four groups (ethicists, philosophers, academic non-philosophers, and non-academics), Schwitzgebel and Cushman (2012) found that everyone's philosophical intuitions about the moral valence of the relevant actions in these two were affected by the order of presentation. They grouped responses into two categories (equivalent responses, where evaluations of moral valence were identical across the two cases; and inequivalent responses, where participants judged the relevant action in Case A to be morally worse than the corresponding action in Case B) and found that participants, regardless of academic background or experience, were more likely to give equivalent responses when Case A was presented before Case B than they were when Case B was presented before Case A.⁶ This suggests that at least some expert philosophical intuitions about the whether an action is morally good/bad are influenced by the order of presentation.

Order effects are one kind of problematic intuitional sensitivity; there are others. Folk philosophical intuitions, for example, seem to be subject to something called the *actor/observer bias*, where evaluations of a given case are influenced by whether the case is presented in the second or third person (for discussion, see Jones and Nisbett 1971). Consider the following case:

Case C

You find yourself in the central square of a small South American town. Tied up against the wall are twenty natives, most terrified, a few defiant, in front of them several armed men in uniform. A heavy man in a sweat stained khaki shirt turns out to be the captain in charge and, after a good deal of questioning which establishes that you got there by accident while on a botanical expedition, explains that the natives are a random group of the inhabitants who, after recent acts of

protest against the government, are just about to be killed to remind the other possible protesters of the advantages of not protesting. However, since you are an honored visitor from another land, the captain is happy to offer you a guest's privilege of killing one of the natives yourself. If you accept, then as a special mark of the occasion, the other natives will be let off. Of course, if you refuse, then there is no special occasion, and Pedro here will do what he was about to do when you arrived, and kill them all. With some desperate recollection of childhood fiction, you wonder whether if you got hold of the gun, you could hold the captain, Pedro and the rest of the soldiers at bay, but it is quite clear from the circumstances that nothing of that kind is going to work: any attempt at that sort of thing will mean that you will also be killed along with all of the natives. The men against the wall, and the other villagers, understand the situation, and are obviously begging you to accept. What should you do? (Smart and Williams 1973, 98)

If expert philosophical intuitions about what actions are morally obligatory are influenced by stable moral considerations, then these intuitions should not be affected by the how the vignette is framed. Yet it turns out that expert moral intuitions display significant framing effects. In a study involving philosophers and non-philosophers, Tobia, Buckwalter, and Stich (2012) found that non-philosophers were much more likely to think that the relevant action was morally obligatory when the vignette was presented in the third person than when it was presented in the first person *and* that philosophers were much more likely to think that the relevant action was morally obligatory when the vignette was presented in the first person than when the vignette was presented in the third person.⁷

Let's look at one more example. Folk philosophical intuitions about a variety of philosophical issues seem to be influenced by normative considerations (for discussion see Knobe 2003, 2010 and Cova this volume). The *side-effect effect* is probably the most famous example of the influence that normative considerations have on how we ordinarily think about the world. Knobe (2003) found that ordinary people are considerably more inclined to judge that an agent brought about a side-effect intentionally when they regard that side-effect as morally bad than when they regard it as morally good. Knobe's model has also been used to show that normative considerations influence a wide variety of other folk psychological judgments, including judgments about advocacy, causation, choice, decision, desire, knowledge, and preference. We are just beginning to see how widespread this influence might be and to come to terms with what this is telling us about how our minds work and how we ordinarily understand the world around us. With this in mind, consider the following two cases:

Case D

A baby was born with a rare genetic condition. The doctors told the baby's parents: "If this baby drinks its mother's milk during the first two weeks of life, it will grow up to have extraordinary mental abilities that make it able to solve very complicated math problems. However, if you instead give it this expensive formula we sometimes use, it won't develop the extraordinary abilities and will just be normal." The parents said: "We have decided not to give the baby the expensive formula. We

will just be feeding it with its mother's milk." As expected, the baby grew up to have extraordinary mental abilities that made it able to solve very complicated math problems.

Case E

A baby was born with a rare genetic condition. The doctors told the baby's parents: "If this baby drinks its mother's milk during the first two weeks of life, it will grow up to have serious psychological disabilities that will make it unable to solve even very simple math problems. However, if you instead give it this expensive formula we sometimes use, it won't develop the extraordinary abilities and will just be normal." The parents said: "We have decided not to give the baby the expensive formula. We will just be feeding it with its mother's milk." As expected, the baby grew up to have serious psychological disabilities that will make it unable to solve even very simple math problems.

If expert philosophical intuitions about whether a specific trait is innate are influenced by purely scientific considerations, then these intuitions should not be sensitive to normative considerations. This is not what we find, however. In a study involving both academic professionals and people working outside of academia, or more particularly, outside of philosophy and specific scientific disciplines, Knobe and Samuels (2012) found that people are considerably more inclined to judge that a trait is innate when the expression of that trait depends on actions they regard as morally good than on actions that they regard as morally bad, and that this is not affected by profession or level of professional training.⁸ This suggests that expert philosophical intuitions and folk philosophical intuitions share sensitivity to normative considerations, although it remains an open empirical question whether these kinds of considerations form part of our conceptual competence or simply figure into our conceptual performance (for discussion, see Alexander, Mallon, and Weinberg 2010).

Taken together, these results suggest that at least some expert philosophical intuitions display the same patterns of problematic sensitivity that are displayed by folk philosophical intuitions, something that is bad news for our folk theory of philosophical expertise.⁹ The news actually gets worse when we consider whether education might actually introduce new patterns of problematic intuitional sensitivity. Consider the following case:

Case F

Ivy is a high school student in Hong Kong. In her astronomy class, she was taught that Tsu Ch'ung Chih was the man who first determined the precise time of the summer and winter solstices. But, like all her classmates, this is the only thing she has heard about Tsu Ch'ung Chih. Now suppose that Tsu Ch'ung Chih did not really make this discovery. He stole it from an astronomer who died soon after making the discovery. But the theft remained entirely undetected and Tsu Ch'ung Chih became famous for the discovery of the precise times of the solstices.

Everybody is like Ivy in this respect; the claim that Tsu Ch'ung Chih determined the solstice times is the only thing that people have ever heard about him.

In a study involving professional philosophers and linguists, Machery (2011) found that expert intuitions about reference, in particular, expert intuitions about who Ivy is talking about when she uses the name “Tsu Ch'ung Chih,” were influenced by a person’s area of research specialization.¹⁰ People with certain areas of research specialization (e.g., semantics and the philosophy of language) were more likely to have Kripkean intuitions than people with other areas of research specialization (e.g., discourse analysis, historical linguistics, and sociolinguistics).¹¹ This suggests that educational background influences at least some philosophical intuitions about reference, something that would be welcome were the influence consistent; but, as Machery argues, these studies suggest an inconsistent influence of educational background on expert philosophical intuitions, something that should give us further reason to worry about the supposed benefits of philosophical education.

4. Conclusion

We began with the attractive idea that philosophical education involves thinking long and hard about philosophical issues, and that philosophical expertise consists in having developed, through this process of critical reflection, increased conceptual competence and theoretical acumen, as well as a special knack for reading and thinking about philosophical thought experiments that call upon us to exercise our conceptual competence and theoretical acumen. And we noted that it is an open question whether this folk theory of philosophical expertise can restore hope in the value of intuitional evidence. We saw that questions about comparative conceptual competence and improved theoretical acumen, as well as questions about the role that philosophical education might play in the production of special procedural knowledge, are actually empirical questions, and suggested that the best place to look for answers to these questions is science, in particular, recent empirical work on the nature of expert philosophical intuitions. And we saw that this work suggests that at least some expert philosophical intuitions display the same patterns of problematic sensitivity that are displayed by folk philosophical intuitions, and that educational background might introduce new kinds of problematic intuitional sensitivity. While this is bad news for the folk theory of philosophical expertise, it is important to note that these are still early days. We are just now beginning to understand philosophical cognition, and some recent empirical work highlights ways for improving folk philosophical intuition, something that suggests how we might achieve genuinely expert philosophical intuition (see, for example, Turri 2013). This is an exciting development that highlights the fact that the more we learn about philosophical cognition, the more there is to learn, and underscores the importance of continued experimental work on philosophical cognition and philosophical expertise.

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7. Biographical Note

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¹ This label comes from Weinberg et al. (2010), who provide the first detailed discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of this defense, including many of the concerns raised in the second section of this chapter. For additional discussion, see Machery (2011), Alexander (2012), Clarke (2013), Nado (forthcoming a, b). A number of philosophers have mounted a version of the expertise defense, including Singer (1972, 1982), Kamm (1993), Devitt (1994, 2006, 2010), Williamson (2005, 2007), Hales (2006), Ludwig (2007), Grundmann (2010), and Horvath (2010).

² There is another way to frame the expertise defense, one that is also represented in the first passage quoted above. On this way of framing things, philosophical education involves a kind of careful practice that helps sort out and track the kinds of conceptual and methodological problems that come from using philosophical intuitions. The basic idea is that, while expert philosophical intuitions might be subject to the same kinds of cognitive limitations as folk philosophical intuitions, philosophical expertise involves awareness of these limitations and the ability to accommodate them in practice. In what follows we will set aside this way of framing the expertise defense in order to focus on a frame more frequently used in current debates about philosophical expertise, but it is important to note here that it is an open empirical question whether philosophical education produces these kinds of cognitive benefits and whether they are used to such good effect in philosophical practice.

³ Weinberg et al. (2010) draw heavily on work by Shanteau (1992) and Ericsson et al. (2006) on the cognitive science of expertise and expert performance.

⁴ Horvath (2010) and Williamson (2011) both suggest that recent worries about the folk theory of philosophical expertise have involved illegitimate attempts to shift the burden of proof about the quality of expert intuitional evidence. This makes it important to be clear that that claiming that Q is an open

question does not involve shifting burdens in any way, but instead involves distributing burdens to everyone. Everyone invested in a discussion shares the responsibility of trying to answer whatever open questions exist in that discussion, and to do so in an open and honest way.

⁵ Ryberg (2013) makes a similar point, arguing against genuine moral expertise at least in part because the quality of moral intuitions cannot be assessed by independent means. Drawing on views about the method of reflective equilibrium, Rini (2013) argues that moral intuitions actually satisfy this independence condition, at least so long as intuitional evidence is measured using the method of wide reflective equilibrium. She goes on to argue that attempts to strength the independence condition risk broad kinds of skepticism. See Alexander (2012) for additional discussions of this kind of worry.

⁶ More specifically, participants were asked to rate (using a 7-point Likert scale with 1 = extremely morally good and 7 = extremely morally bad) the degree to which felt that a specific action was morally good/bad. Since the doctrine of double-effect predicts that people will think that it is morally worse to harm one person as a means for saving the lives of others than it is to do harm one person as a side-effect of saving the lives of others, Schwitzgebel and Cushman excluded participants who judged that the relevant action is Case B was morally worse than the corresponding action is Case A. 70% of the remaining participants gave equivalent responses when Case A was presented before Case B, while only 54% of the remaining participants gave equivalent responses when Case B was presented before Case A. The difference was statistically significant at the level $p < .001$, effect sizes were similar for all groups, and the effect was statistically significant for each group. Similar results were found using a variety of different cases involving the doctrine of double-effect, moral luck, and the supposed distinction between action and omission.

⁷ More specifically, 19% of undergraduate participants judged that the action was morally obligatory when the vignette was presented in the first person, while 53% of undergraduate participants judged that the action was morally obligatory when the vignette was presented in the third person. A Fisher's exact test revealed that the difference was statistically significant at the level $p < .05$. By contrast, 36% of professional philosophers judged that the action was morally obligatory when the vignette was presented in the first person, while only 9% judged that the action was morally obligatory when the vignette was presented in the third person. Again, a Fisher's exact test revealed the difference was statistically significant at the level $p < .05$.

⁸ More specifically, participants were asked to rate (using a 7-point Likert scale with 1 = disagree and 7 = agree) whether they thought the relevant trait was innate. The mean response for participants who were asked to consider Case D was 4.56, while the mean response for participants who were asked to consider Case E was 3.90. The difference is statistically significant at the level $p < .001$. A 2x2 ANOVA showed that there was no effect ($F(1,4020) = 2.7, p = .10$) and no significant interaction ($F(1,4020) = 1.2, p = .27$) for profession or level of professional training. Similar results were found using a variety of different cases.

⁹ See Schultz, Cokely, and Feltz (2011) for additional empirical work on expert philosophical intuitions.

¹⁰ See Machery et al. (2004, 2009) for evidence of cross-cultural folk intuitional diversity about reference.

¹¹ More specifically, participants were presented with the following question: "Having read the above story accepting that it is true, when Ivy uses the name 'Tsu Ch'ung Chih,' who do you think that she is actually talking about: (A) The person who is widely believed to have discovered the solstice times, but actually stole this discovery and claimed credit for it; or (B) The person who (unbeknownst to Ivy) really determined the

solstice times? 86% of participants whose areas of specialization were semantic or philosophy of language reported Kripkean intuitions, while only 69% of participants whose areas of specialization were discourse analysis, historical linguistics, and sociolinguistics reported Kripkean intuitions. This difference is statistically significant ($\chi^2(2, N=133) = 5.97, p = 0.15$).